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Abstract
This article explores the connections between Melvil Dewey and
Hegelianism and Charles Cutter and the Scottish Common Sense philoso-
phers. It traces the practice of hierarchy from these philosophical inﬂuences
to Dewey and Cutter and their legacy to today’s Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation
and Library of Congress Subject Headings. The ubiquity of hierarchy is linked
to Dewey’s and Cutter’s metaphor of organizing the mob of information
into an orderly army using the tool of logic.
Introduction
Much of Western philosophy implies or expounds directly a notion of
hierarchy. From Aristotle through Francis Bacon to Hegel and beyond,
logic, in particular, bears a hierarchical stamp. At the same time, systems
for topical organization of information typically exhibit hierarchical struc-
tures. The pervasiveness of hierarchy is not surprising in a culture such as
our Western culture derived from Greek and later European thought and
further developed in the settler cultures such as those of the Americas.
However, examining it more closely helps us to understand both its opera-
tions and its ramiﬁcations. This paper will examine two schools of philoso-
phy and two streams of organization of information to trace the inﬂuence
of philosophy on the founders of our systems of subject access and on cur-
rent standards with an emphasis on their hierarchical structures.
The Army and the Mob in Dewey and Cutter
Melvil Dewey and his Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation (DDC ) show the in-
ﬂuence of Hegel and American Hegelians while Charles Cutter and his
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legacy, the Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH), show the inﬂuence
of Thomas Reid and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers. In doing
so, both Dewey and Cutter, the two “fathers” of modern subject access prac-
tice, used the metaphor of an army to justify their imposition of a hierar-
chical structure to order the chaotic mob of information.
Dewey was particularly dramatic in his use of the mob/army metaphor.
He asserted (in his “simpliﬁed speling”) that:
A larj business or work unclasifyd or uncharted is not a worthy organi-
zation but mere material from which a clever brain may construct one.
It differs in efﬁciency from the ideal as a mob of men differs from a
wel disciplind army. Piles of brik and mortar ar not a templ any more
than heaps of typ ar Shakspere’s works, tho if “clasifyd” and set, each
in ryt relation to the rest, the transformation is bro’t about. (Dewey,
1932, hereafter DDC13, p. 44—emphasis added in all quotations)
Dewey viewed information as a chaotic jumble needing order. He used a
variety of metaphors to bring home this point. Taking examples from busi-
ness, the military, religion, and literature, Dewey asserted that classiﬁcation,
broadly conceived, is necessary for overcoming chaos. In each instance,
Dewey offered only two choices: mob or army, bricks or a building, miscel-
laneous words or a masterpiece. Order, in Dewey’s view, comes from “a clev-
er brain”—which I interpret to mean one that employs reason or logic.
Charles Cutter, on the other hand, was not creating a classiﬁcation. He
was creating a dictionary catalog to assign names to information. The cha-
os addressed by Cutter comes from the alphabet rather than from a mob
of raw material. Cutter wanted to change the mob for an army, absurdity
for logic:
The dictionary catalog sets out with another object and a different
method [than the classiﬁed catalog], but having attained that object—
facility of reference—is at liberty to try to secure some of the advan-
tages of classification and system in its own way. Its subject-entries, in-
dividual, general, limited, extensive, thrown together without any logical
arrangement, in most absurd proximity—Abscess followed by Absentee-
ism and that by Absolution, Club-foot next to Clubs, and Communion to
Communism, while Bibliography and Literary history, Christianity and The-
ology, are separated by half the length of the catalogue—are a mass of
utterly disconnected particles without any relation to one another, each
useful in itself but only by itself. But by a well-devised net-work of cross-
references the mob becomes an army, of which each part is capable of
assisting many other parts. The effective force of the catalog is immense-
ly increased. (Cutter, 1904, p. 79)
As with Dewey, the choice that Cutter offered is a limiting duality. Either
the catalog can be made up of individuals (a mob of individuals) or it can
be a highly restrictive hierarchical structure (an army). No other options
were considered. Cutter identiﬁed two options for a structure: the logical
and the absurd. The absurd juxtapositions of alphabetical structure are like
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a mob. A logical structure, however, creates an order as efﬁcient as that of
an army. Cutter’s implied presumption is that there are only these two
options: logic or absurdity, the army or the mob. His acceptance of this
dualism led him to adopt a hierarchical structure for his universal language.
The structure that Cutter devised to arrange entries so that they may be
easily found is a hierarchical structure formed by cross-references.
Cutter and Dewey may well have chosen as they did without speciﬁc
philosophical inﬂuences. Western philosophy has hierarchy as one of its
underlying themes. However, the entrenched and ubiquitous nature of
hierarchy in Dewey’s and Cutter’s writings and in DDC and LCSH suggests
a particularly intense operation of the discourse of hierarchy. Their link-
ing of reason or logic with the structure of an army invites further explora-
tion of such strong hierarchical tendencies.
Hegel and Dewey
G. W. F. Hegel has been speciﬁcally linked to Dewey (Wiegand, 1998).
Dewey’s philosophical mentor at Amherst College, Julius Seelye, was a fol-
lower of Hegel (Wiegand, 1998, p. 185) and William T. Harris, whose St.
Louis Public School Library’s classiﬁcation was a basis for DDC (Wiegand,
1996, p. 23), was a leader of the American, or St. Louis, Hegelians, publisher
of their Journal of Speculative Philosophy, and author of a book explicating
Hegel’s logic (Harris, 1895).
Seelye was not only a professor and later president at Amherst. He trans-
lated Albert Schwegler’s History of Philosophy, viewed by Harris as a signiﬁ-
cant work in the study of Hegel (Harris, 1867, p. 250). Wayne Wiegand trac-
es Seelye’s Hegelianism and its inﬂuence on Dewey and his classiﬁcation
in his article on the “Amherst Method” (1998), including the impact of texts
used by Seelye and others in Dewey’s subarrangement of classes. Wiegand
illustrates that Dewey was clearly subject to inﬂuence, with Hegelians high
on the list of his authority ﬁgures.
Harris’s classiﬁcation for the St. Louis public schools is widely credited
for the choice and sequence of main classes in DDC. In the acknowledgments
from the ﬁrst edition to the thirteenth (the last to which he personally con-
tributed), Dewey notes that although he did not see Harris’s scheme before
he had completed the most important parts of his own, “In ﬁlling the 9 clas-
es of the skeme, the inverted Baconian arranjement of the St Louis Library
was followd” (Dewey, 1932, p. 46). Harris, in turn, served as a cooperating
editor of Dewey’s Library Journal and used DDC at the United States Bureau
of Education’s library when he was head of the Bureau (Leidecker, 1946, pp.
341, 468). Harris (1895) wrote an explication of Hegel’s logic credited with
being more Hegelian than Hegel. In a tribute to Harris, Edward E. Richard-
son describes Harris’s Hegelianism as characterized by a devout belief in
rationalism and its reliance on logic alongside a belief in history as a progress
toward the ideal of freedom and individuality (1936, pp. 33–35).
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The actual progression of main classes in DDC seems to be drawn from
Hegel, probably via Harris (Graziano, 1959; Comaromi, 1976, pp. 25–29;
Olson, 2001). Harris’s biographer, Kurt Leidecker, accepts that Harris in-
ﬂuenced Dewey in this regard (1946, p. 340). Given earlier Hegelian in-
ﬂuences on Dewey, it is altogether likely that Dewey and Harris were
sufﬁciently in tune to share ideas about classiﬁcatory structure consonant
with the fundamental logic that Hegel propounded.
Hegel’s system of logic implies hierarchy. He deﬁned three quantita-
tive “moments”: individual, particular, and universal in increasing order of
generality. Each of these moments characterizes an element in each ﬁgure
of the three syllogisms Hegel proposed in his system of logic. As an exam-
ple, the ﬁrst is the commonly identiﬁed syllogism linking the individual (I)
instance of “Gaius” to the universal (U) notion of mortality via the partic-
ular (P) category of “man”:
All P are U All men are mortal
I is P Gaius is a man
∴I is U ∴Gaius is mortal
In classiﬁcatory terms, “mortal beings” is the main class, which is subdivid-
ed by various species including “man,” and “Gaius” is a further subdivision
of “man.” This syllogism follows the pattern of deductive logic in which a
conclusion is inferred from accepted premises. Hegel used the whole/part
or genus/species hierarchy of universal/particular/individual to structure
the inference. Hegel’s syllogism reﬂects basic Aristotelean logic—part of
the Western philosophical tradition (see Olson, 1999 for a related discus-
sion of Aristotle and classiﬁcation).
The syllogisms that Hegel proposes in his system also include an induc-
tive syllogism as a subclass of his syllogism of allness. The inductive syllo-
gism follows the following pattern:
I1, I2, I3, . . . In are P Gaius et al are mortal
All P include I1, I2, I3, . . . In All men include Gaius et al
∴P are U ∴Men are mortal
The operation of induction, like the deduction of the ﬁrst syllogism, rests
on a hierarchy. But in the inductive syllogism, it is a hierarchy in which
the individual instances are the evidence that implies the link between the
particular and the universal. In either instance, the three moments—
individual, particular, universal—relate to each other via hierarchical ge-
nus/species or whole/part relationships. “Everything is a syllogism, a uni-
versal that through particularity is united with individuality. . . .” (Hegel,
1969, p. 669).
Hegel built on the three moments of deﬁnition through a second pro-
cess, division. Harris interpreted Hegel’s “division” as “classiﬁcation”:
“Classiﬁcation is a synthetic operation in which is expressed the necessary
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relation of all the determinations of the universal. The contents are exhibit-
ed exhaustively” (Harris, 1895, p. 394). Or as Hegel put it: “The universal
must particularize itself; . . . the individual content of cognition ascends
through particularity to the extreme of universality. . . .” (Hegel, 1969, p. 800).
This pattern is identical to W. C. Berwick Sayers’ description of how tradi-
tional classiﬁcations are structured: “The major principle originally ex-
pounded was that classiﬁcation should start with knowledge in its totality
and divide it up into classes . . . the idea of starting with large subject ﬁelds
and dividing them up, using one characteristic at a time, so that eventually
they had attempted to list all departments of knowledge in a systematic
sequence moving, from the very general to the highly specialised, in a se-
ries of regulated steps” (Sayers, 1967, pp. 43–44).
The dialectic to which this cognitive technique contributes is a method
that proceeds through stages to an absolute. “The dialectic is no inﬁnite
progress, but it brings us to a ﬁnal category. . . .” (Harris, 1895, p. 402). Hence,
the pinnacle of the logical progression that depends on the link of individu-
al, particular, and universal is an absolute idea or absolute knowledge.
Harris and his fellow St. Louis Hegelians applied Hegel’s dialectic in
their everyday concerns. They used it to explain what they saw as the nec-
essary evil of the Civil War as well as a means of reforming education and
even improving turkey and squirrel hunting (Pochmann, 1948, p. 33). So
applying it to a library classiﬁcation as Harris and then Dewey did was no
far stretch.
Dewey created his hierarchical arrangement by gathering like entities
in a structure that progresses through ranks of relationships between things,
much like a syllogism:
The ﬁeld of knowlej is divided into 9 main clases, numberd 1 to 9, and
cyclopedias, periodicals etc. so jeneral as to belong to none of these clas-
es ar markt 0 (naught) and form a 10th clas; e.g. clas 1 is library of
Filosofy; clas 5, library of Syence; clas 9, History, etc. These special clases
or libraries ar then considerd independently, and each is separated
again into 9 special divisions of the main subject, numberd 1 to 9, as
wer the clases, jeneral works belonging to no division having 0 for their
division number. Thus 59 is division 9 (Zoolojy) of clas 5 (Syence). A
3d division is then made by separating each of these divisions into 10
sections, numberd in same way with 0 and the 9 dijits; and this deci-
mal subdivision is repeated, til it secures as many subsections as may
be needed in any topic. Thus 513 is section 3 ( Jeometry) of division 1
(Mathematics) of clas 5 (Pure syence). (Dewey, 1932, p. 15)
Dewey’s use of classes, divisions, and sections recalls the hierarchy of an
army (indeed, his tens and hundreds recall the Roman army). The Oxford
English Dictionary deﬁnes them as:
class . . . A division or order of society according to status; a rank or
grade of society. . . . A division of things according to grade or quality,
as high or low, ﬁrst, second, etc. . . .
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division . . . The action of dividing or state of being divided into parts
or branches; partition, severance. . . . The fact of being divided in opin-
ion, sentiment, or interest; disagreement, variance, dissension, dis-
cord; . . . classification; . . . A portion of an army or ﬂeet, . . .
section . . . A part separated or divided off from the remainder . . . Mil.
A fourth part of a company. . . .
Each differentiation of the hierarchical arrangement compounds the sep-
aration of classes, dividing same from different as more levels are added in a
chain of facets like a chain of command. Instead of the chaos of a mob,
Dewey introduced the rigidity of an army. “Thus all books on any givn sub-
ject stand together, and no aditions or chanjes ever separate them” (Dew-
ey, 1932, p. 22).
Nonetheless, one of the problems that Dewey addressed was the inﬂex-
ibility of everything being in its place if that place was a speciﬁc position
on a library shelf. His hierarchical arrangement possessed another attribute
of an army:
In relativ location it is like ﬁnding a soldier if yu know his army, divi-
sion, rejiment and cumpany. If John Smith is 3d man in 2d row of
Cumpany B, rejiment 69, 4th division, whether the rejiment is in camp,
on parade or on march, his place is not determind by the bit of ground
on which he stands, but by his relation to the rest of the army. If sol-
diers ar ded and in the cemetery they ar as eazily found by ﬁxt as by
relativ location. But if the army is alive and militant, as every library or
private working colection o’t to be, its resources shud be ﬁndabl whether
in camp, on march or in action. (Dewey, 1932, p. 22)
Having lived through both the American Civil War and World War I, by the
time these words were published in the last edition of DDC during his life-
time, it is not surprising that Dewey wanted to link his classiﬁcation to the
living soldiers as opposed to the dead. He will have been familiar with the
image of mass cemeteries of both wars in which individuals were named on
row upon row of white crosses. However, his living soldiers are “in camp,
on parade or on march,” not in battle where even decimal systems cannot
overcome chaos.
The Scottish Common Sense Philosophers and Cutter
Charles Cutter’s use of the mob vs army metaphor is present in his Rules
for a Dictionary Catalogue from the ﬁrst edition (1876) to the generally cited
fourth edition (1904). Cutter’s educational and social contexts reﬂected the
American version of the Scottish common sense philosophical tradition
(Miksa, 1977, pp. 32–34; Miksa, 1983, p. 40). As a student at Harvard, a
Unitarian, and a member of Boston’s intelligentsia, Cutter was exposed to
the ideas of Scottish philosophers such as Thomas Reid1  and Dugald Stew-
art, especially through the interpretation of Ezra Abbot, textual scholar,
assistant librarian, and chief cataloger at Harvard at the time (Miksa, 1977,
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pp. 19, 32). Cutter was at Harvard as a student and then a librarian from
1851 to 1868 (Miksa, 1977, pp. 19–20). Before and during that time, the
Scottish Common Sense philosophers were required reading at the major
colleges in the eastern United States. Their views were widely popularized
and became a pervasive inﬂuence on American society (Martin, 1961, pp.
13–39; Bryson, 1968, p. 3; Miksa, 1977, p. 34; Miksa, 1983, p. 40). Even in
the 1870s the Scottish school was still inﬂuential enough to be the old guard
(Martin, 1961, p. 162). Abbot helped Cutter translate the Scottish philoso-
phy prevalent at the time into the concept of systematized library catalog-
ing (Miksa, 1977, p. 49). Cutter developed from this inﬂuence the notion
of three levels of subject: individual, lower order abstractions, and ﬁrst
principles (Miksa, 1977, p. 52). These levels are parallel to Hegel’s individ-
ual, particular, and universal moments.
The Scottish common sense school began as a reaction to David Hu-
me’s skepticism—a concern held in common with Hegel.2  Reid described
this skepticism as “absurd” (1997, p. 32), just as Cutter described the mob
of the alphabet as analogous to absurdity. Philosophy had built up to such
a level of esoteric argument in Hume that Reid found its artiﬁciality more
than he could bear. Further, Reid suggested that Common Sense should
be the measure of sound philosophy and that its opposite is absurdity:
If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitu-
tion of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a neces-
sity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being
able to give a reason for them; these are what I call the principles of
common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call
absurd. (Reid, 1997, p. 33)
In the service of common sense, Reid (along with Dugald Stewart) endorsed
inductive reasoning on the basis of mutual causation of particular effects
(Olson, 1975, pp. 46ff, 115; Marcil-Lacoste, 1982, pp. 149–150). That is, the
common cause of particular phenomena can be identiﬁed inductively by
drawing generalizations from these speciﬁc instances. Francis Miksa ex-
plains: “Given this way of relating kinds of ideas, all ideas could be viewed
as elements of a single classiﬁcatory hierarchy. . . .” (1983, p. 43). As de-
scribed above in relation to Hegel’s second syllogism, induction depends
on a whole/part or genus/species hierarchical relationship between con-
cept and evidence.
Cutter was following just such a model when he created a structure he
termed “syndetic” to achieve a hierarchical arrangement in the dictionary
catalog. His deﬁnition belies the primacy he gave to hierarchical relationships:
Syndetic, connective, applied to that kind of dictionary catalog which
binds its entries together by means of cross-references so as to form a
whole, the references being made from the most comprehensive sub-
ject to those of the next lower degree of comprehensiveness, and from
each of these to their subordinate subjects, and vice versa. These cross-
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references correspond to and are a good substitute for the arrangement
in a systematic catalog. References are also made in the syndetic cata-
log to illustrative and coördinate subjects, and, if it is perfect, from
speciﬁc to general subjects. (§§ 187–188.) (Cutter, 1904, p. 23)
Only as an aside in the last sentence of his deﬁnition did he mention the
possibility of relationships other than hierarchical ones. He imposed a hi-
erarchy on the chaos of language as if it had no order already. He rejected
the structure of the alphabet and, instead, chose the only other option he
saw: hierarchy.
Cutter’s notion of a dictionary catalog ﬁt logically with Reid’s “common
theory of ideas,” which followed an empiricist line in linking ideas to ma-
terial things (Seth, 1890, p. 18; Broadie, 1990, p. 113). Reid also believed
that language reﬂects our experience, with words having “a just foundation
in nature” (Reid, 1785, p. 22). In addition to the senses as a source of em-
pirical knowledge, Reid and other Scottish Common Sense philosophers
recognized certain powers innate to humanity, including “memory, concep-
tion, abstraction, judging, reasoning, taste, moral perception [and] con-
sciousness” (Bryson, 1968, p. 132). The Scottish Common Sense philoso-
phers did not develop a full-blown system of rational logic as Hegel did, but
rather focused on intuitional principles and knowledge as a reﬂection of
the world around them (Seth, 1890, pp. 196–197). These characteristics
seem to foster principles more suited to a dictionary catalog such as liter-
ary warrant. However, the simple occurrence of a topic does not make it a
valid subject in this sense. It must have its place in the inductively deter-
mined hierarchy (Miksa, 1983, p. 60).
Another Scottish Common Sense philosopher widely studied in the
United States in Cutter’s time, Adam Ferguson, suggests that “In other class-
es of animals, the individual advances from infancy to age or maturity; and
he attains, in the compass of a single life, too all the perfection his nature
can reach: but, in the human kind, the species has a progress as well as the
individual; they build in every subsequent age on foundations formerly laid;
and, in a succession of years, tend to a perfection in the application of their
faculties, to which the aid of long experience is required, and to which many
generations must have combined their endeavours” (1995, p. 10). In his An
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1995), Ferguson described the progress
of “rude nations” as they developed systems of property ownership and the
arts (including the “civil and commercial arts”) as having standard progres-
sions from one stage to another. Reid was less explicit about historical pro-
gression, but seems to be following the same kind of logic linking hierar-
chy and teleology: “The chain of natural causes has, not unﬁtly, been
compared to a chain hanging down from heaven: A link that is discovered
supports the links below it, but it must itself be supported; and that which
supports it must be supported, until we come to the ﬁrst link, which is sup-
ported by the throne of the Almighty. Every natural cause must have a cause,
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until we ascend to the ﬁrst cause, which is uncaused, and operates not by
necessity but by will” (Reid, 1785, p. 115).
In Cutter’s dictionary catalog, the chain is forged by references until a
general heading is reached that has no broader concept. The references
proceed only one level at a time. As Reid put it in a letter: “Human knowl-
edge is like the steps of a ladder. The ﬁrst step consists of particular truths,
discovered by observation or experiment: the second collects these into
more general truths: the third into still more general. But there are many
steps before we come to the top. Ambitious of knowledge, and unconscious
of weakness, we would fain jump at once from the lowest to the highest. But
the consequence of this is that we tumble down and ﬁnd that our labor must
begin anew” (Olson, 1975, p. 36).
Legacy of a Metaphor
The standards that follow from Cutter’s and Dewey’s work reﬂect the
hierarchical structures of the army. The Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation (DDC)
and the Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH) are their legacy. These
structures are as arbitrary as the alphabetical proximities that concern
Cutter in that they privilege hierarchical relationships over all other types
of relationships. They also embody a rigidity that inhibits LCSH and DDC
in their ability to adapt to changing contexts.
Hierarchy in DDC
The hierarchical nature of DDC is still as Dewey described it. In the
introduction to the twenty-ﬁrst edition, there is an explanation of DDC’s
“principle of hierarchy” manifested in both the structure and notation of
the classiﬁcation. “Structural hierarchy means that all topics (aside from the
ten main classes) are subordinate to and part of all the broader topics above
it” (Dewey, 1996, hereafter DDC21, p. xxxiii). This arrangement is a clear
indication of classiﬁcation as an inductive tool. If one is to use the lower
levels of the hierarchy as evidence of the generalization, then it is impera-
tive that those lower levels carry the characteristics of the generalities they
represent.
The introduction also points out that “The corollary is also true: what-
ever is true of the whole is true of the parts. This important concept is some-
times called hierarchical force. Any note regarding the nature of a class holds
true for all the subordinate classes, . . .” (DDC21, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv). As a
result, the hierarchy shapes the topics within it as Hegel’s universal shapes
the individual through the particular. The multitude of commonalities that
offer possibilities for classiﬁcation are represented in the rigidity of a chain
of facets rather than as they might relate in different ways. The rejection
of relationships other than hierarchical ones is apparent in the need to
instruct classiﬁers in handling them. If, for example, a document has more
than one subject in the same discipline: “Class a work dealing with interre-
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lated subjects with the subject that is being acted upon. This is called the
rule of application, and takes precedence over any other rule. For instance,
class an analytical work dealing with Shakespeare’s inﬂuence on Keats with
Keats” (DDC21, p. xxxvi).
There is not a way to represent the relationship between Shakespeare
and Keats as there is to represent the relationship between dogs and poo-
dles. Of all of the nonhierarchical relationships possible, the best that DDC
can do is to offer a “table of last resort” for deciding which of the dismem-
bered aspects of an unrepresentable topic one should choose to represent
(DDC21, p. xxxviii). In a system grounded exclusively on hierarchy, there
is not room for other inﬂuences.
Hierarchy and LCSH
A similar situation holds for the Library of Congress Subject Headings
(LCSH). In assigning subject headings, the cataloger is instructed in the
Subject Cataloging Manual: Subject Headings to assign the most speciﬁc head-
ing available (Library of Congress, 1996, hereafter SCM:SH, H 180, p. 2).
The cataloger ﬁnds this speciﬁc heading by following the reference struc-
ture of NARROWER TERMS (NT) down the hierarchy as far as it applies. Given
the hierarchical structure of LCSH, this dictum is logical. However, it pre-
sumes that all headings and, therefore, all topics ﬁt neatly into hierarchies.
If they do not ﬁt, then the cataloger will be led astray by the NT references.
This rule also presumes that all catalogers think in the same hierarchies.
Miksa (1983) explicates a change in the concept of a subject between Cut-
ter and his successors, losing its “classiﬁcatory referent.” However, the pres-
ence of hierarchy is still clear in the current LCSH (see, for example, Wein-
berg, 1993).3
The construction of the hierarchical NT/BT (BROADER TERM)
references is governed by strict rules. Three types of hierarchical relation-
ships require references: genus/species, whole/part, and instance
(SCM:SH, H 370, p. 1). Further, all headings are required to have a BT
unless they fall into one of ﬁve categories of “orphans” (SCM:SH, H 370,
pp. 3–4). Every heading must be part of a hierarchical genealogy with that
context affecting the meaning of headings similar to hierarchical force in
DDC. Another telling instruction for showing hierarchical relationships
requires that an intermediate heading be established if needed to ﬁll a
hierarchical gap created by a new heading (SCM:SH, H 370, p. 5). This
requirement avoids unnecessary “orphans” by making certain that all head-
ings in a hierarchy have a BT without jumping the chain of command. What
is interesting about this rule is that LCSH operates on the basis of literary
warrant, which requires that a subject heading be established “for a topic
that represents a discrete, identiﬁable concept when it is ﬁrst encountered
in a work being cataloged, . . .” (SCM:SH, H 187, p. 1). Headings are not to
be created for new topics not yet identiﬁable and topics for which there is
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not consensus on terminology. It is surprising to ﬁnd, in the context of rules
governing the creation of references, a clear contravention in the cause of
avoiding “orphans” of this principle of literary warrant. It is another indi-
cation of the primacy of hierarchy in subject access.
Another reinforcement of the hierarchy comes in the rules for creat-
ing associative references (RELATED TERMS—RT) representing all
nonhierarchical relationships. RTs are to be minimized “to focus empha-
sis on hierarchical references” (SCM:SH, H 370, p. 10). There are only three
instances in which associative references are allowed: linking overlapping
terms, linking a discipline with its object of study, and linking a person with
their ﬁeld. However, RTs may be made for these relationships only if they
do not begin with the same word stem, have a BT in common, or have broad-
er terms that are already associatively linked (SCM:SH, H 370, pp. 10–11).
The second and third exclusions once again demonstrate hierarchical re-
lationships overriding other considerations.
The requirements for making hierarchical references, the overriding
of literary warrant, and the minimizing of associative references for the
stated purpose of focusing on the hierarchical leave no doubt about the
intended structure of LCSH. It is as unrepentantly hierarchical as DDC.
Conclusion
Although Sayers said that for Dewey and Cutter “classiﬁcatory practice
forged ahead of theory” (1967, p. 43), it seems that they did draw at least
the hierarchical aspect of their practice from the prevailing philosophies
of their day. Reid and the Scottish common sense tradition were interest-
ed mainly in theories of perception. Hegel and the American Hegelians
espoused a system of dialectical progress toward an absolute knowledge or
ideal. However, both perspectives offered a structure of hierarchy ingrained
in Western philosophy and derived anew by Dewey and Cutter as armies of
information, even though from two quite different schools of thought.
The choice that both Dewey and Cutter made was clearly the army rath-
er than the mob. The idea that it was a binary choice is one of the prob-
lems we continue to confront. Even as LCSH tries to implement literary
warrant, it is held in check by the discipline of the hierarchy. An army rep-
resents a particular type of regimented, circumscribed, hierarchical orga-
nization. As we face the continuing complexities of organizing information
in our hybrid environment of traditional, digital, and multimedia resources,
it behooves us to bear in mind that our one pervasive basis for organiza-
tion is not the only one.
Notes
1. Reid was at one point college librarian at Marischal College in Aberdeen, Scotland (Broad-
ie, 1990, p. 105).
2. For a comparison of Hegel and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, see Seth (1890).
3. See Dykstra (1988) for a critical discussion.
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